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| What defines "you"; Been pondering what "I" am | |
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| Topic Started: 10 May 2012, 07:49 AM (2,365 Views) | |
| Dogsi | 10 May 2012, 07:49 AM Post #1 |
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If I lose my arm, I will still view myself as the same person. The same is true with the loss of any part of my body that doesn't alter my mind. However, if something were to alter my mind in a significant manner, I would no longer consider myself to be the same person I am today. As such, I see my mind as who I am. However, that lead me to ponder a copy of my mind. If I were to able to copy my mind over some one else's mind, would that person then be me? Would there then be 2 of me? |
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| Nemesis | 10 May 2012, 08:30 AM Post #2 |
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Internet Zombie
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Only for less than a second. |
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| JeffroTheMan | 10 May 2012, 02:22 PM Post #3 |
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Jacob is a 12 year old boy. Jacob goes through puberty. Jacob should theoretically no longer consider himself to be Jacob? This thread is essentially a restating of the mind-body problem, if I'm understanding it correctly. I don't think the two are separate. The mind is a construct of the brain, which is a part of the body like any other organ. |
| "Should've been a soldier, I could've fought and died/ but there's no revolution, so I bought a bride." -Bought a Bride, Brand New | |
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| salamutスタッフ | 10 May 2012, 02:25 PM Post #4 |
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فقط الحفاظ على الابتسام
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'You' are the identity that I assign to you generically'. Your arm may be apart of your identity, it may not. Identity is an issue of perception, and we know where that leads. |
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| Taelôk | 10 May 2012, 06:37 PM Post #5 |
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Chess Noob
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I am just the experience of my consciousness.
No, I reject that because I would not experience the copied mind in first person. |
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People who are unable to motivate themselves must be content with mediocrity, no matter how impressive their other talents. Andrew Carnegie My blog, dare ye click? Online meanderings and web-thought | |
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| fdrake | 10 May 2012, 11:54 PM Post #6 |
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@Jeffro
Well you can never be in the same body twice. ![]() @Taelok
Do you think that there's any difference between the experience of consciousness and consciousness itself? |
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A stranger has come To share my room in the house not right in the head. | |
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| Taelôk | 11 May 2012, 05:39 AM Post #7 |
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Chess Noob
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No, but the creation of an identical copy of my consciousness, is not the transference of my ablity to experience. I am the first person narrative. Edited by Taelôk, 11 May 2012, 05:41 AM.
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People who are unable to motivate themselves must be content with mediocrity, no matter how impressive their other talents. Andrew Carnegie My blog, dare ye click? Online meanderings and web-thought | |
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| fdrake | 11 May 2012, 08:17 AM Post #8 |
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Great stuff. Let's go a step further, Taelok. When I say "Taelok", does "Taelok" refer to those abilities manifesting? Does it pick out the "I" in the sense you just stated? |
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A stranger has come To share my room in the house not right in the head. | |
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| Dogsi | 11 May 2012, 09:06 AM Post #9 |
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Thanks, well said. |
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| Taelôk | 11 May 2012, 09:10 AM Post #10 |
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Chess Noob
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When you say Taelok, it refers to what you can perceive as the "entity" Taelok. I am not "Taelok" in that sense. I am not what you perceive to be the "what". However, I am "Taelok" insofar as it encapsulates to mean "my" narrative, which just means that I can perceive my existence. Would I (this current consciousness) be able to perceive the narrative of my copied consciousness? If not, then how can it be "my" narrative? Which as far as I can tell, is the "I" Edited by Taelôk, 11 May 2012, 09:35 AM.
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People who are unable to motivate themselves must be content with mediocrity, no matter how impressive their other talents. Andrew Carnegie My blog, dare ye click? Online meanderings and web-thought | |
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| Triplock | 11 May 2012, 12:54 PM Post #11 |
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How 'bout your DNA? That's pretty definitive. Despite pseudo-metaphysical meandering there is such as thing as "objective you". |
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| Taelôk | 12 May 2012, 07:00 AM Post #12 |
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Chess Noob
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So you think if I were to have you cloned, as far as you are concerned you and it (the clone) are the same entity? Metaphysical meandering is one thing, but so is reductionism taken to vapid and overly simplistic answers. Edited by Taelôk, 12 May 2012, 07:03 AM.
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People who are unable to motivate themselves must be content with mediocrity, no matter how impressive their other talents. Andrew Carnegie My blog, dare ye click? Online meanderings and web-thought | |
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| Triplock | 12 May 2012, 07:28 AM Post #13 |
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Telomere ends motherfucker. If I were cloned my DNA would not be the same. 'mmkay? |
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| Taelôk | 12 May 2012, 08:02 AM Post #14 |
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Chess Noob
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Assume this clone is perfect, it's "you" in every regard concerning DNA. (even after 50 years) Is it still you?
Edited by Taelôk, 12 May 2012, 08:03 AM.
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People who are unable to motivate themselves must be content with mediocrity, no matter how impressive their other talents. Andrew Carnegie My blog, dare ye click? Online meanderings and web-thought | |
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| Triplock | 12 May 2012, 08:13 AM Post #15 |
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I dunno. Which is all anyone can reply to a hypothetical question expecting an empirical answer. |
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| fdrake | 12 May 2012, 09:07 AM Post #16 |
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If you start by assuming that Taelok is identical with any manifestation of this narrative, then insofar as the copy manifests this narrative, it's identical with Taelok. If you then go on to say that Taelok is only identical with that manifestation of the narrative - being the manifestation of the narrative dubbed "Taelok" is no longer sufficient for being Taelok. Since this and that narrative are identical but this is Taelok and that isn't. There's an ambiguity in the set up, too. If we can go about perceiving a narrative which is identical with ourselves, and this capacity is not accounted for by being that narrative [as in, the narratives themselves are reflexive], we cease to be just the constructed narratives since then these narratives don't take into account their ability to be reflexive [as in, there is a capacity of Taelok which isn't given in the narrative. I don't think the question's well posed, since it seems that in order for two consciousness to be identical they must at least be able to attain first person perspective on the same causal history. If it were just accessing a perspective on a causal history - two people who agree on a theory, insofar as they are thinking it, have the same state of mind - destroying any nuances subjects have. |
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A stranger has come To share my room in the house not right in the head. | |
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| Ardat | 17 May 2012, 07:18 AM Post #17 |
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Made a blog post on the subject. It's relevant here, so I'll just copy-paste it. If we think in a materialistic frame work, the only valid one in my opinion, consciousness is a tricky beast. You have to explain it with biological, chemical and physical processes while addressing the decision making mechanism, or why you have the illusion of it. The assumption that we’re the sum of an unfathomable amount of physical processes isn’t really a stretch. Evolutionary biology traces our existence back to a bunch of unicellular organisms consisting in a sum of simple molecules. If we are the result of millions of years or genetic mutations, then consciousness can really only be an emergent biological property, ‘cause that’s the extent of the genetic mutations’ reach. Being conscious then amounts to having sensors centered around a data interpretation apparatus. How does it actually interpret information, I have no idea. It’s obviously not trivial, otherwise computers wouldn’t have such an hard time to imitate us. So we’re the convergence of physical mechanisms working along, or fighting against each others, depending on whether or not the stimuli we’re responding to happen to be conflicting for us. That convergence is somewhat rigged by a biological structure that has evolved over millions of years, and it’s completed by a social conditioning that depends on our education, our memories, etc. So where the hell do the notions of ego and free will come from? Why the fuck do we imagine being unitary entities capable of making decisions? In my opinion, it all relates to our ability for self-contemplation. I like to think of consciousness as a Taylor series involving some sort of acknowledgement operator. Suppose the convergence of physical effects I’ve mentioned before results in a thought, or a succession of thoughts, that entails a specific action. They are then the last two steps of a reaction that one could have, but they happen to be the only ones that you can acknowledge by simply being you, with no other tools to observe yourself. So in essence, you think you’re the one responsible for the decision of perpetrating an act ‘cause you’ve witnessed the thought resulting in it spurring into you own mind as if it had been created by you. The illusion of free will is you reacting to an incomplete observation of your reaction, it’s a second-order acknowledgement. The impression of unitarity comes about in a similar fashion. One’s acknowledgement of those last two steps effectively ensures he’ll always believe his thoughts and actions are emerging in the same manner, and from the same place. If we instinctively define ourselves by them, which we do, then there’s no way to lose, and you will have a sense of continuity of yourself. A sense of unitarity. Now, since I’ve mentioned the use of a Taylor series, I should point out that it’s always possible to go further than a second-order aknowledgement, ‘cause you can use self-contemplation as another stimulus, and keep on going. And just as with a Taylor series, the contribution given by higher orders of acknowledgement gets weaker and weaker, since you can’t spend an infinite amount of time reflecting on yourself. The process is also stopped when you manage to isolate what you believe to be the definitive cause of your own reaction. At this point, you could technically continue, but self-acknowledgement becomes a tautology in your own set of beliefs, which you’re trapped in. From that point of view, the only way free will could exist would be if the thought you’re having is capable of influencing the reaction process that produced it in the first place, which is impossible. It can obviously change the outcome of another reaction chain, but in that case, it just becomes another one of those converging processes. It’s not free will anymore. To conclude, I’ll say that I realize the analogy with a Taylor expansion is a little misplaced, but I still like it, so fuck you. |
| What's more fun than fighting crime? | |
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| Dogsi | 29 May 2012, 07:16 AM Post #18 |
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It didn't address the topic at all ![]() An interesting read though and succinctly expressed my own opinion of free will . It's been quite a while since I have worked with Taylor series but I don't really see the analogy. Mind elaborating? A question for you: since free will does not exist and a person is only carrying out the actions that physics demands they carry out, do you believe it is inappropriate to condemn their actions? |
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| Ardat | 29 May 2012, 07:41 AM Post #19 |
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Well, it kinda did, since I talked about how the notion of ego comes about, and justified it with my notion of what is a human being. Since you're always capable of taking your own reaction as a stimulus that entails another reaction chain, that reaction of the "second order" gives a contribution to what you are too. Taking your second-order reaction as a stimulus will constitute a third order reaction, and so on and so forth. You end up with a potentially infinite sum of acknowledgement taken to a different power, with decreasing contribution to the total (since it's easier to react to an external factor than to reflect on your reaction, which in turn is easier than to reflect on your reflection of your reaction, etc). Of course, in practical terms, you don't spend an infinite amount of time to reflect upon yourself, so it's never an infinite sum. It becomes an algorithmic process that can be stopped depending on your intelligence, beliefs and the time you have before you're forced to react to another external factor. The intelligence parameter ensures a continuity with other living creatures: there's no real discontinuity with them (which is a good thing, 'cause the evolutionary process is more of less continuous), they just have a lesser capacity for n-degree acknowledgement than we do. Not at all. I see society as a self-correcting system, provided it's given energy, for which justice and morality are mechanisms ensuring stability. It's just a system "absorbing" a small perturbation so it can retain its structural integrity, nothing more. |
| What's more fun than fighting crime? | |
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| Dogsi | 29 May 2012, 07:47 AM Post #20 |
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So morality is utility? |
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